searching for processes triggered by European integration in a case that should be a fairly difficult one for the robust impact hypothesis.
THE HUNGARIAN PARTY SYSTEM
Without a single genuinely new parliamentary party in the post-communist period, the Hungarian party system seems indeed to be unusually stable. Even the principal issues that define left and right are the same today as 16 years ago. But from the original moderately fragmented party system a strongly polarized quasi-two party system has developed. The relative significance of individual parties has also fluctuated drastically prior to 2000 (Tables 1 and 2) . Tables 1 and 2 here In 1990 the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was the largest party. After an early democratic nationalist phase it turned into a Christian-Democratic and conservative party, but conflicts between its liberal and populist, moderate and radical right wing groups have wracked the party throughout its career. The party has managed to survive only by relying on various 2 forms of cooperation with the ascending force of the right, Fidesz.
Since 1997 Fidesz has been the dominant right-wing party of the Hungarian party system. After left-libertarian and mainstream liberal periods, the party moved to the right.
Today it is a conservative, culturally right wing, economically centrist party that often relies on populist/anticapitalist, anticommunist and nationalist slogans.
The Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP) was the major player in the brief democratic The principal party of the left is the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the successor of the former ruling communist party. Since 1994 MSZP has been a large, and often the largest party, and so far the only one to win two elections. The main popular appeal of the party resides in its pragmatism. While inherited assets and nostalgia for the communist regime play an important role in its success, the MSZP's actual economic programme has been centrist or even centreright.
Orthodox communists set up their own party in 1989. The Munkáspárt (Labour or Workers' Party) has a nostalgic, anti-capitalist rhetoric. Though its discourse reflect the attitude of many voters, the party never managed to enter parliament.
In terms of cultural issues the parties provide distinct alternatives. Anti-communism, clericalism, nationalism, libertarianism are the principle issues that differentiate left and right. Economic attitudes play some role in party choice, but as government incumbents are more pro-market than the opposition (Tóka, 1997 and ) economic issues have not produced a stable division between the parties.
The drop in the number of effective electoral parties from 6.7 to 2.4 shows that, in terms of voter support, the country is very close to a two-party system. The number of parliamentary parties also decreased from 3.7 to 2.2, but there are still more than two players as far as the government is concerned. Although the two major groups occupy nearly 90 per cent of the seats in the 2002-06 parliament Hungary has never had a single-party government. But the nature of party competition has become more predictable over the years. The major electoral stake since 1998 is whether a Fidesz-dominated right-wing bloc or an MSZP-dominated left-wing bloc rules the country. Union but always regarded the defence of domestic agricultural producers as the primary task of government. They were characterized by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) as Eurocynical, lacking a genuine positive attachment to the EU. The extreme right MIÉP and the extreme left Labour were the only parties that opposed Hungary's integration with NATO and the EU, a position derived from their common radical stand against the influence of multi-national corporations.
THE PARTIES' EUROPEAN PROFILE
Although Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) characterize Hungary as the country with most partybased Euroscepticism in Europe, the political class was in fact united in supporting accession.
Even parties that regarded accession as disadvantageous under current conditions did not rule out future membership. Views that integration was beneficial for Hungarians in neighbouring countries prevented the emergence of strong nationalist opposition to the EU.
Motives and arguments for joining the EU varied because interpretations of what the EU stood for ranged from a cosmopolitan (left) view to a traditionalist, anti-communist (right) approach.
Right-wing parties associated the EU with the fight against communism, Christian Democratic principles and economic benefits. The left emphasized the EU's anti-nationalist credentials and its provision of an optimal framework for further modernization. Politicians on both sides could claim to represent integration more genuinely than their counterparts. 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE
The Hungarian public has always been in favour of accession, and in 1990 the Eurobarometer already found 81 per cent to be in favour of EU membership. The proportion of respondents who were uncertain or rejected the European Union rarely reached a third, with transition losers and the rural population constituting the most sceptical segments (Csepeli and Závecz, 1997) . As in the region at large (Cichowski, 2000) those who were more enthusiastic about democratization and market liberalization also supported the EU. The greatest enthusiasts are found among the young and the educated, although social structural variables explain only a small portion of the variance on this issue (Karácsony, 2004) . with the EU commanding more respect than any national political institution (parliament, government, parties), even though they are valued more than the East European average.
As a result of tough negotiations with the EU and increasing party polarization on the issues the 64 per cent approval rate declined to 45, and negative opinion increased to 32 per cent just before accession (Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2004) . But while diffuse support declined
Hungarians were still found to be in favor of all major EU projects (EMU, common foreign policy, common defense, enlargement) and, after a brief period of Euroscepticism, support has again risen. Given the high general level of support for the EU, any association with party preference is not very strong. In accordance with the profile of party elites, MIÉP, Smallholder and KDNP electorates have been repeatedly found to be somewhat less, and SZDSZ supporters somewhat more, pro-EU than average voters. Supporters of the parties in government were found, in general, to be more enthusiastic about accession than the opposition.
But the more critical attitude of the right wing elite left some mark on citizen orientations, and after 2002 Fidesz voters also became more Eurosceptic (Table 3) . In 2004 the distribution of pro-and anti-EU groups was respectively 62 versus 6 per cent among left-wing identifiers and 45 against 19 per cent among the right wingers. Karácsony (2004) observed that the left had finally found its own positive value, that of European integration. Orientations towards the EU showed an increasing degree of correlation with the principal issues of Hungarian politics, including anti-communism, which was now associated with anti-EU views (Karácsony 2003) . Table 3 here
While the regular government-opposition shift seems to support Cichowski's (2000) point that voters have no strong opinion on the subject and use party affiliation as a cue, the evolution of a left-right polarization tends to substantiate the alternative perspective (Tucker et al., 2002 ) that parties adjust their position to the orientation of their followers. Yet, in spite both of growing polarization and the existence of hard Eurosceptic parties, anti-EU segments of the population 9
have not found yet their party. The bulk of anti-EU voters are still without a party preference.
VOTING ON EUROPE

The referendum
Attitudinal distributions have potential importance, but politics is shaped by actual behaviour.
The EU referendum was regarded by the media and the elite as a major watershed, a final exit from the communist past. Accordingly, the campaign before the referendum was organized more lists respectively. All three of them were thought to be optimal for mobilizing the party base.
Gábor Demszky, mayor of Budapest, and former president of the Free Democrats, also decided to stay in national politics after leading the party list and being voted into the European Parliament. His story was somewhat different from the others, though, because he did actually start to work at the European Parliament, and only after finding out that the position of mayorship and of MEP are incompatible did he decide to step down. But the presence of a 14 number or politicians who had ambitions to continue with their Hungarian carrier confirmed the general understanding that the election was about domestic affairs and domestic stakes.
The parties also made some attempt to produce lists that satisfied the 'European' taste. The MSZP nominated a large number of women, who therefore had a majority in the MSZP MEP faction. The SZDSZ and Fidesz nominated Roma candidates, as a result of which the only two Roma MEPs of the European Parliament come from Hungary. MSZP also nominated a politician who was involved in Roma politics.
Results and implications
Electoral turnout was lower than predicted, as in the EU referendum. But this time, at 38.5 per cent, Hungary ranked high among the new accession countries. The domestic focus seems to have helped. The number of voters at the EP election was the same as the number of those who said 'yes' at the referendum (three million).
The unequivocal winner of the election was Fidesz (Table 4) . Its result, 47.4 per cent, was higher than ever before. Had it achieved this result at the national election it would have gained a twothird majority in the parliament. Fidesz and MDF received almost 12 percent more than in 2002:
the right-wing opposition humiliated the government (Table 5) . MDF only barely cleared the five per cent threshold, but since most predictions suggested otherwise this was perceived as a major victory of Ibolya Dávid over the internal opposition. SZDSZ could also celebrate, as the party won two per cent more than at the national election in 2002.
Tables 4 and 5 here
The results of the election strengthened some previously existing tendencies but also set a new dynamic in motion. Those parties that failed (again) to reach the threshold suffered a severe blow in the eyes of the public, as the EP election was widely seen as the last chance for such parties to prove their relevance. Their poor result (they received less than five per cent overall) is 15 somewhat paradoxical, as they were the ones who claimed to represent the Eurosceptic Hungarian public.
For Fidesz the election proved that the leftist-populist turn of the party was well received by the public, and it has followed this new course ever since. SZDSZ also interpreted its seven per cent as a relative success and confirmation of the focus on classical liberal themes. While the election results simply stabilized the already existing strategy and internal balance of power in these parties, for the Hungarian Democratic Forum clearing the threshold meant the elimination of internal opposition and the ultimate decision to pursue a strategy that separates MDF from 
EUROPEANIZATION OF HUNGARIAN PARTIES
Embeddedness in European structures
Hungarian parties have been actively seeking links to Western party alliances from the very beginning of their existence (Table 6 ). But the first election already proved that international links are no substitutes for domestic roots. The two parties that most emphasized their international embeddedness, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats (who used the EU flag in their campaign), emerged from the founding election as marginal players. While
European party structures do not seem to be able to sustain otherwise unpopular actors, they do prove to be able to inflict damage on parties that deviate from European norms. The representatives of the European People's Party and the EUCD repeatedly urged the Smallholders and the KDNP to return to a more moderate course, and at one point they publicly distanced themselves from both these parties. While it is difficult to prove that these gestures caused the marginalization and ultimate disappearance of these two parties from the parliamentary scene, the party elites were definitely embarrassed and the internal opposition was provided with a powerful weapon. 
Organization
Over the years Hungarian parties have imported a number of organizational techniques from
Western sister parties and received direct campaign support in various ways. The Socialists introduced a gender-and age-based quota system similar to that existing in many Western
European parties, and both Fidesz and MSZP introduced the institution (though not the practice yet) of intra-party referendums. The diffusion of organizational techniques is acknowledged by politicians: when the Socialist party president set up a permanent programme committee within the party his argument was that such committees exist in other EU socialist parties. Fidesz has established sections for various social strata in the party with explicit references to the practice of European people's parties.
Since the rules of the EP election gave all the power over nomination and campaigning to party headquarters one could have expected an increase in elitism and centralization within the organizations. But Hungarian parties were so centralized that further moves in this direction were difficult to envisage. In the only relatively factionalized and decentralized party, the MSZP, the emergence of a new layer of power (that of the Europoliticians) has contributed rather to increasing complexity and stratarchy. In the leadership battles that followed the EP election 2. The identity of parties has been unaffected by accession. But it is again important to note that the lack of recent change is due to the fact that an orientation towards Europe was part of most parties' core identity already in 1989.
3. The format of the Hungarian party system has changed considerably due to the drastic decline in the number of parties, but this has had little to do with the EU. These feelings seem to translate with low efficiency into party representation for three reasons:
1. EU-issues have a secondary relevance for most voters.
2. Even those who reject the EU may consider their opinion to be inadmissible.
3. Anti-EU attitudes happen to be a characteristic of the least active voters.
According to Bielasiak (2004) have the opportunity to change leaders and become more attuned with the public mood. The existence of a low-stake interim election also allows parties to experiment with new strategies and rehearse for the next national election, thus preparing them to fend off new challengers more effectively.
It is difficult to group these phenomena into direct and indirect forms of EU impact, and probably better to see the significance of European integration as providing politicians with new sets of tools. Parties exploit the newly opened opportunities, but mainly in order to strengthen established organizational and ideological identities. For an innovative party leadership Europe provides plenty of new resources, a development that is true irrespective of the party's ideological colouring. It is significant that Fidesz, the party that among mainstream contenders 23 has made most critical gestures towards the EU, models its official identity most closely on European Union actors and has developed the highest degree of integration between its national and European components. Hungarian experience also shows that a simultaneous presence in several arenas allows parties to form different images and attract divergent groups of supporters.
It seems that playing with Europe is a potentially promising activity even if Europe as an issue has a relatively low salience. In coming decades the winners are likely to be the parties that acquire the skills relevant to this new environment and its particular dynamics.
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